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PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE INCEPTION OF THE 
POLISH “NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION” OF 1989 
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Abstract: This study puts forward a frame of analysis of the Polish “negotiated 
revolution” of 1989, which initiated the revolutionary regime changes that took place in East-
Central Europe (ECE) that year. The 1989 events in ECE had three particular features: they were 
non-utopian; they were not carried out in the name of a particular class; and they were non-violent 
(with the conspicuous exception of Romania). Considering these specific aspects, this author 
contends that the 1989 events can be termed “postmodern revolutions.” In order to explain the 
Polish “negotiated revolution” of 1989, the present study employs an explanatory model 
previously applied to the bloody revolution of December 1989 in Romania, which takes into 
consideration both the domestic developments and the entangled histories of the Soviet bloc 
countries over the period 1945–89, as well as the issue of recent path dependence. The main 
assumption is that the collapse of communist rule in Poland and in the other five communist 
countries which experienced a regime change in 1989 was provoked by a complex interplay of 
structural, conjunctural and nation-specific factors. 
Keywords: negotiated revolution; reactive sequence; Poland; communism; 1989. 
 
 
Throughout the “miraculous year” 1989, six countries in East-Central 
Europe (ECE) experienced a revolutionary situation: Poland, Hungary, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. It is this author’s opinion 
that, from the present day perspective, the key questions to be asked with regard 
to the 1989 phenomenon are: (1) Why did those revolutionary events occur 
precisely in 1989? (2) Why did the communist regimes in ECE collapse in that 
particular order? and (3) Why were the 1989 events in ECE not violent, with the 
exception of Romania? As one can easily observe, these fundamental questions 
relate to the timing, sequence and nature (violent or non-violent, negotiated or 
non-negotiated) of the 1989 events in ECE. The present study proposes a frame 
for the analysis of the Polish “negotiated revolution” which initiated the 
revolutionary regime changes that took place in 1989 in ECE. As argued 
elsewhere, these events had three particular features: they were non-utopian; 
they were not carried out in the name of a particular class; and they were non-
violent (except for the Romanian revolution). Considering these specific 
aspects, this author contends that the 1989 events in ECE can be termed 
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“postmodern revolutions.” In order to explain the Polish “negotiated revolution” 
of 1989, this study employs an explanatory model previously applied to the 
bloody revolution of December 1989 in Romania, which takes into 
consideration both the domestic developments and the entangled histories of the 
Soviet bloc countries over the period 1945–89, as well as the issue of recent 
path dependence. The main assumption is that the collapse of communist rule in 
Poland, as well as in the other five communist countries which experienced a 
regime change in 1989, was provoked by an intricate interplay of structural, 
conjunctural and nation-specific factors (Petrescu 2010). 
 
 
Conceptual Framework and Methodological Approach 
 
The 1989 phenomenon consisted in the breakdown of the communist 
regimes in six countries with different cultural-historical and socio-economic 
backgrounds and characterized by distinct political cultures. Moreover, these 
communist regimes fell in a particular order, which the present analysis terms as 
the 1989 sequence of collapse of the communist dictatorships in ECE, namely: 
Poland–Hungary–East Germany–Czechoslovakia–Bulgaria–Romania. It is quite 
obvious that such a complex phenomenon does not allow for a single-factor 
explanation. A variety of factors influenced the political decisions by 
incumbents and opposition groups in ECE throughout the revolutionary year 
1989. As pointed out, this author contends that a complicated aggregation of 
structural, conjunctural and nation-specific factors determined the regime 
changes of 1989. These factors operated and interacted in various ways in each 
of the countries analyzed, but they were nevertheless present in each case. 
Furthermore, the particular way in which the above-mentioned factors 
aggregated determined eventually the nature of the revolution in each case, as 
well as the order in which the six communist dictatorships were overthrown. 
This approach has been inspired by the work of Ole Nørgaard and Steven L. 
Sampson, who, in their 1984 study “Poland’s Crisis and East European 
Socialism,” explained the birth of Polish Solidarity as an outcome of social and 
cultural factors (Nørgaard and Sampson 1984). 
In order to permit a better understanding of the way structural, 
conjunctural and nation-specific factors aggregated in the case of communist 
Poland, the explanatory model first employed by the author in order to explain 
the Romanian revolution of 1989 is sketched below (Petrescu 2010, 27–72). 
Structural factors were common to all societies where state socialism came into 
being by the imposition of the Soviet model from “above and abroad,” and 
whose exit from communism occurred during the same year 1989. In the terms 
of the present analysis, two structural factors are of prime importance: economic 
failure and ideological decay. In the countries of “actually existing socialism,” 
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economic performance was an essential source of legitimation for the power 
elites. Thus, economic failure refers primarily to the perceived failure of state 
socialism to offer a living standard similar to that of the more advanced Western 
societies, and not necessarily to the absolute failure of those regimes to achieve 
a certain level of economic development. Ideological decay manifested 
differently in the six countries which experienced a regime change in 1989. For 
instance, in Hungary ideology ceased to be a driving force in the regime’s 
relationship with Hungarian society in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution, 
while in Poland a similar phenomenon could be observed especially after the 
military coup conducted by General Wojciech Jaruzelski in December 1981.  
Conjunctural factors are of two kinds: internal and external. In the Polish 
case, two external conjunctural factors were particularly influential, namely, the 
“Gorbachev” and “Vatican” factors. The coming to power of Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev, who became secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union in March 1985, and the launch of his program of reforms had an 
immense impact on the communist regimes in Sovietized Europe. Moscow’s 
renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was an event of paramount importance, 
which paved the way for the political transformations in ECE. Furthermore, the 
1978 election of a Polish Pope had a direct influence on the development of 
dissident stances in Poland in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. This 
factor is especially important for the present analysis, because it contributed 
significantly to the initiation of the 1989 revolution in Poland, which triggered 
then a chain reaction in ECE and ultimately led to the collapse of five other 
communist regimes. This chain reaction has been termed, following Samuel P. 
Huntington, as the “snowballing effect” (Huntington 1991, 33). Obviously, this 
effect did not operate in the Polish case. 
The nation-specific factors have been defined in such a way as to permit a 
thorough examination of patterns of compliance or conflict with authority under 
communist rule. Thus, the analysis of the interaction between regime and 
society brings us to the study of cultural values, attitudinal patterns and 
behavioral propensities in the Sovietized countries in ECE. Culture provides a 
framework through which incumbents, political leaders or power elites tend to 
understand the claims and actions of their opponents and react to them, and vice 
versa. The present study employs the concept of political culture in order to 
analyze the specific relationships between political structures and cultures, as 
well as the particular patterns of interaction between regime and society 
(Almond 1990; Verba 1974; Brown 1977). Applied to all the six countries, such 
an approach allows one explain the nature of the regime changes, as well as the 
particular order in which the six communist dictatorships in ECE collapsed. The 
present study focuses on the Polish “negotiated revolution,” and therefore 
addresses two major political cultures, namely: regime political culture – termed 
as the political culture of the Polish communist regime and community political 
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culture – termed as the political cultures of resistance in communist Poland, 
which are understood in accordance with Kenneth Jowitt’s frame of analysis 
(Jowitt 1992, 51–52 and 54–56). 
 
 
Explaining the Polish Revolution: 
Structural, Conjunctural and Nation-Specific Factors 
 
This section discusses the way in which a particular aggregation of 
structural, conjunctural and nation-specific factors determined the inception of 
the “negotiated revolution” of 1989 in Poland. The analysis starts by examining 
the structural factors, namely, economic decline and ideological decay. One can 
argue that Poland illustrates best the close relationship between politics, 
economy and social protest under communist rule. As Bartłomiej Kamiński 
aptly observes, in the case of communist Poland one should examine carefully 
the “pulsations in economy and politics.” The same author argues that the 
period 1949–88 can be divided in accordance with the criterion of the net 
investment rate into four investment cycles: 1949–57; 1958–71; 1972–82; and 
1983–88 (Kamiński 1991, 26). If one examines these cycles, one finds that all 
of them ended with a political crisis. After the first two cycles, that is, in 1956 
and 1970, social unrest and violent confrontations between the population and 
the authorities occurred, and thus a change in leadership followed shortly. The 
first cycle finished with a social and political crisis that provoked the first major 
working-class rebellion in Poland (Poznań, June 1956) and led to the return of 
Władysław Gomułka to power (the Polish October of 1956). The second cycle 
finished with another wave of working-class unrest. This time, the protests 
turned violent in the shipbuilding centers on the Baltic Coast, in Gdańsk, 
Gdynia and Szczecin. This major crisis provoked the fall of Gomułka and the 
coming to power of Edward Gierek (December 1970). 
The outbursts of popular discontent of 1956 and 1970 clearly indicated 
that providing for the population remained the only powerful legitimation tool 
in the hands of the ruling Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). Upon his 
coming to power after Gomułka’s ousting, Gierek adopted a strategy of 
economic development that bore some fruit up to the mid-1970s, but which was 
far from being viable in the long term. In June 1976, a long-delayed decision to 
raise the prices of consumer goods provoked a new wave of protests by the 
working class. As noted, the protests were also suppressed rapidly, but their 
importance lies in the creation of the Committee for the Defense of Workers 
(Komitet Obrony Robotników–KOR), the organization which laid the 
foundations of the cross-class alliance and thus paved the way for the birth of 
Solidarity. The crises that characterized the final stages of the next two 
investment cycles, namely 1972–82 and 1983–88 were managed non-violently 
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in 1980 and 1989 respectively. The crisis that marked the end of the third cycle 
deserves further examination. Towards the late 1970s, the demand for consumer 
goods remained high and could not be met, and thus the regime was compelled 
to introduce price increases for basic foodstuffs in July 1980. When the regime 
announced such news, the coastal workers conducted another wave of open 
protest. However, the strike which broke out at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk 
proved to be different from the previous strikes, which had ended in violence 
and bloodshed. Instead of marching into the town, the workers engaged in a 
non-violent occupation strike and asked for the right to establish an independent 
trade union. Reluctantly, the regime opened negotiations with the rebellious 
workers and signed the Gdańsk Agreement on 31 August 1980. By signing this 
agreement, the regime accepted the existence of Solidarity as an independent 
trade union. However, the compromise reached in August 1980 represented 
only a temporary victory of Solidarity’s “self-limiting revolution,” and did not 
result in a change of system (Staniszkis 1984). Consequently, the negotiated 
solution of August 1980 could not solve the economic and political problems 
posed by the logic of the party-state. On the contrary, it led to the military coup 
of December 1981 and the imposition of Martial Law. 
The fourth cycle also ended non-violently. This time, however, the 
Jaruzelski regime and the opposition epitomized by Solidarity reached a 
negotiated solution that went beyond the confines of a “self-limiting 
revolution.” Through the legalization of Solidarity and its acceptance as a 
political competitor, it evolved into a non-violent regime change. In this respect, 
it may be argued that the Polish “negotiated revolution” of 1989 represented the 
final stage of the “self-limiting revolution” conducted by Solidarity after its 
establishment in August 1980. In the case of Poland, throughout the communist 
period, recurrent outbursts of social discontent warned the PUWP against its 
mistaken economic policies. Therefore, one might conclude that the poor 
economic performance of the system played a significant role in the final 
demise of Polish communism. However, a comprehensive explanation of the 
inception of the 1989 sequence of collapse in Poland cannot rely entirely on the 
influence of economic factors. Ideological decay, which is another structural 
factor that deserves closer examination, is addressed below. 
During the period August 1980–December 1981, ideological decay 
became evident against the backdrop of the political changes that signaled the 
coming to power of the “party-soldiers.” In February 1981, General Jaruzelski 
was appointed prime minister and a few months later, in October 1981, he took 
over the post of first secretary of the PUWP as well. Such a political change was 
unprecedented: for the first time in the history of the PUWP, a “communist in 
military uniform” became the supreme leader of the party. Finally, on 13 
December 1981, Jaruzelski carried out the military coup that put an end to the 
political changes inaugurated through the Gdańsk Agreement. The imposition 
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of Martial Law represents perhaps the most striking proof of the final demise of 
ideology in communist Poland. The Jaruzelski regime relied increasingly on 
bureaucratic coercion instead of selective terror. According to Jadwiga 
Staniszkis, during this period the exercise of power was reminiscent of 
“bureaucratic Stalinism, non-ideological and based on the state not the party.” 
Leszek Kołakowski also observes that Polish communism under Jaruzelski 
represented a curiosity, namely, “a communism without ideology,” a condition 
that contributed to its demise in 1989 (apud Swidlicki 1988, 7). 
As shown above, contingency played a significant role in the final demise 
of the communist dictatorships in ECE. Of the two kinds of conjunctural 
factors, external and internal, the external conjunctural factors were the most 
influential in the case of Poland. Given the nature of the power relations 
between the Soviet Union and its European satellites, it is obvious that one 
external factor – which might be called the “Kremlin factor” – always 
influenced the decisions made by the power elites in Sovietized Europe 
throughout the period 1945–89. Until the mid-1980s, the “Kremlin factor” was 
synonymous with the involvement of Moscow in the domestic affairs of the 
“fraternal” countries in ECE, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 or in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Once Gorbachev came to power and engaged in a bold 
program of reforms, the “Kremlin factor” evolved into the “Gorbachev factor” 
and became synonymous with restructuring and openness. In Poland, the 
country which initiated the sequence of collapse, the changes in the Soviet 
Union represented the most influential external conjunctural factor. Its impact 
should be understood in terms of the supplementary burden put on the power 
elite in Warsaw during the terminal phase of communist rule in 1988–89. In his 
book-length dialogue with Zdeněk Mlynář, Gorbachev confesses that after his 
coming to power he warned the leaders of the communist regimes in ECE that 
Moscow would renounce the doctrine of limited sovereignty: “Immediately 
after the funeral of my predecessor, [Konstantin U.] Chernenko, I called a 
conference of political leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries and told them 
clearly that now we were actually going to do what we had for a long time been 
declaring: we would adhere strictly to the principle of equality and 
independence.” As Gorbachev further points out, that was a clear indication that 
Moscow would not interfere anymore in the internal affairs of a “fraternal” 
country, but his warning was not taken seriously: “This meant that we would 
not commit acts of intervention or interference in their internal affairs. My 
counterparts at that conference, as I came to understand later, did not take what 
I said seriously. But I did adhere to this principle and never departed from it” 
(Gorbachev and Mlynář 2002, 84–85). After two Soviet military interventions, 
in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), and a Soviet-backed military 
coup in Poland (1981), the ruling communist parties in ECE were suddenly left 
to their own devices. In this context, the power elite in Poland sought an exit 
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from the structural economic and moral crisis of state socialism by initiating a 
“preemptive action” aimed at conducting a “pacted transition” to a new political 
order by opening talks with the opposition.  
Besides, the “Vatican factor” influenced significantly the structuring of 
the anti-communist opposition in communist Poland. In fact, the election of the 
Archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła, to the papal throne on 16 October 1978 
represented an event of major significance not only for Poland, but also for the 
entire Soviet bloc. According to Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Catholicism 
was a major transnational actor which was able to mobilize anti-regime 
resources: “Sociologically and politically, the existence of a strong Roman 
Catholic Church in a totalitarian country is always a latent source of pluralism, 
precisely because it is a formal organization with a transnational base. The 
papacy can be a source of spiritual and material support for groups that want to 
resist monist absorption or extinction [original emphasis]” (Linz and Stepan 
1996, 260). In the case of communist Poland, the Roman Catholic Church under 
Pope John Paul II became an external conjunctural factor that contributed in 
many respects to the birth of Solidarity and, some ten years afterwards, to the 
initiation of the “negotiated revolution” in that country. As Adam Michnik aptly 
notes, Solidarity was able to combine the Catholic Church’s resistance to 
totalitarianism and its teachings on truth with a pluralistic vision of civil society 
(Michnik 1998, 75–76). 
 In addition, unexpected events of historic significance or crucial 
decisions made by the Western powers contributed considerably to the demise 
of communist dictatorships in Poland and the rest of ECE. The “Reagan factor,” 
i.e., the determination of the American President Ronald Reagan to establish a 
high-tech spatial weapon system, forced the Soviet Union to invest more in 
weaponry and thus weakened it economically, influencing indirectly the 
breakdown of the communist regimes in Sovietized Europe, Poland included. 
Finally, the “snowballing effect,” conspicuously absent in the Polish case, was 
actually unleashed by the Polish Roundtable Agreement of 5 April 1989 to last 
until 22 December 1989, when Romanian communism was brought down by a 
bloody revolution. The fact that a very powerful factor, the “snowballing 
effect,” which was extremely influential in all the other five countries, was not 
present in the Polish case poses difficult problems of interpretation concerning 
the way the external conjunctural factors aggregated and contributed to the 
demise of the Jaruzelski regime. Yet, external conjucture alone could not 
explain the regime change of 1989, which was determined by a particular 
aggregation of all the factors presented above. 
As mentioned, nation-specific factors refer to the political culture of 
Polish communism and the political cultures of resistance. When examining the 
political culture of Polish communism, this author follows the periodization 
proposed by Norman Davies, namely:  communist takeover, 1944–48; Polish 
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Stalinism, 1948–56; national-communism, 1956–80; interval of Solidarity, 
1980–81; military dictatorship, 1981–83; and terminal illness, 1983–89 (Davies 
2001, 3–25 and 408–15). The particular way in which the communist elite 
reacted to the working-class protests or dissident actions, as well as the impact 
those actions had on single-party rule and the policies subsequently adopted by 
the regime, were influenced by the level of cohesion of the respective elite. A 
monolithic party could engage more easily in repressive actions meant to 
silence societal protests without making relevant concessions to the protesters. 
However, a party that was more likely to face a major split at the top during, or 
in the immediate aftermath of, a major upheaval was prone to reacting more 
favorably to social demands. This brings us to the issue of crisis management. 
When societal protests result in splits at the top and changes in leadership, the 
new leaders are more often than not inclined to adopt policies meant to reduce 
for a while the social tensions. Such periods are usually characterized by 
ideological relaxation and economic liberalization and during such intervals the 
nuclei of civil society flourish. In Poland, a major change of political vision 
occurred at the power elite level in early 1981. As already hinted, this consisted 
of: (1) the gradual concentration of power in the hands of General Jaruzelski; 
and (2) the coming to the fore of the nomenklatura in military uniform. 
Jaruzelski was the first high ranking army officer to hold the highest position in 
the party apparatus, and thus his appointment signaled a major break with party 
traditions. Therefore, two issues concerning the political culture of Polish 
communism, which also characterize two periods of its history during the years 
1948–89, deserve further examination. One is the vision of politics of the 
“civilian party” in power (1948–81), while the other concerns the vision of 
politics of the “military party” in power (1981–89). 
When examining the political culture of Polish communism, one should 
consider two fundamental aspects: the cohesion of the power elite and its 
previous experience in crisis management. From 1944 to 1989, the following 
officials headed the Polish Workers Party, and subsequently, the Polish United 
Workers Party: Władysław Gomułka, 1944–48; Bolesław Bierut, 1948–56; 
Edward Ochab (March–October 1956); Władysław Gomułka (second time), 
1956–70; Edward Gierek, 1970–80; Stanisław Kania, 1980–81; and Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, 1981–89. As noted, the Polish ruling elite faced three major crises, 
i.e., October 1956, December 1970 and August 1980, leaving aside other crises 
of lesser impact on the relationship between the communist party and society, 
such as those of March 1968 (the “anti-Zionist” campaign) and June 1976 (the 
working-class revolts of Ursus and Radom). Only in Poland did the communist 
party in power have such a large number of supreme leaders, which is also 
indicative of the numerous splits at the top of the PUWP as a consequence of 
social crises. Therefore, it may be argued that during the period 1944–81 factionalism 
was a major feature of the political culture of the Polish communist regime. 
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A fundamental change occurred after the declaration of Martial Law in 
Poland in December 1981. The military coup marked a shift in terms of regime 
political culture. From late 1981 to early 1989, the political culture of Polish 
communism was significantly altered. The coming to power of the “military 
party” put an end to party factionalism. After all, the existence of factions of 
hardliners and softliners within the PUWP, whatever this meant at different 
moments in time, contributed to the birth of Solidarity in August 1980. Under 
Jaruzelski, political decision-making was concentrated in the hands of the 
supreme leader of the party, who had his decisions obeyed in accordance with 
the established military chain of command. Therefore, it may be argued that in 
early 1989 Jaruzeski had the means to impose his political will upon the party 
and thus inaugurate a phase of political bargaining with the democratic 
opposition. As Ray Taras observes: “Jaruzelski’s role in pursuing roundtable 
talks and the democratic breakthrough that they produced was … pivotal.” The 
same author also referred to a Solidarity activist who cited a remark by 
Jaruzelski: “Please remember that only General de Gaulle was capable of 
getting France out of Algeria,” and subsequently concluded: “This was a 
portentous statement because it meant that only General Jaruzelski could get the 
PUWP out of Poland” (Taras 1999, 374). Jaruzelski’s decision to engage in a 
second “preemptive action” in early 1989 is addressed below in the section on 
recent path dependence. 
Nevertheless, political action by the leadership of the PUWP cannot fully 
explain the road to the historic elections of June 1989 in Poland. It was also the 
strategy of self-restraint interiorized by Solidarity from the very moment of its 
establishment in August 1980 and its willingness to negotiate in a hostile 
environment. The following section addresses the intricate issue of the political 
cultures of resistance in communist Poland. As already noted, the imposition of 
Martial Law considerably weakened the Polish opposition. Solidarity was 
banned and was forced to take a defensive stance and transform itself into an 
underground movement. The army officers in power made extensive use of 
force in order to tame society. Many important figures of Solidarity and the 
KOR were interned, while others went underground. However, the commitment 
to “building civil societies outside the totalitarian state,” as Michnik puts it, did 
not fade away. After Lech Wałęsa, the leader of Solidarity, was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in October 1983, he and his independent trade union 
achieved worldwide recognition. In the meantime, the international context also 
changed. As already noted, the coming to power of Gorbachev, and his 
renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine redefined the relations between the 
Soviet Union and the “fraternal” countries in ECE.  
These changes had an impact not only on the power elites in the Soviet 
bloc, but also on the dissident groups and opposition movements. Upon his 
release from prison in August 1986, Michnik observed that the general 
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repressive framework devised by the Jaruzelski regime was becoming less and 
less effective, but so were the underground structures put into place by 
Solidarity. As he further pointed out, one could observe three major tendencies 
among Solidarity members and sympathizers: (1) leave the organization; (2) 
continue the underground struggle; or (3) put pressure on the regime to re-
legalize Solidarity. Michnik’s central argument is that the transformation of 
Solidarity into an “open structure” and thus into a political force able to speak 
on behalf of the Polish opposition represented a fundamental political decision 
that opened the way for the “negotiated revolution” of 1989: “In the end, 
Solidarity, under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa, was able to fashion an open 
structure. This structure allowed Solidarity to confer a national political 
dimension on the workers’ strikes of May and August 1988” (Michnik 1998, 
141–42). 
It appears that the two waves of social mobilization of April-May and 
August 1988 eventually convinced the authorities to initiate contacts with 
Solidarity. General Czesław Kiszczak, the minister of internal affairs, met with 
Wałęsa in late August and in September. Throughout the fall of 1988, the Polish 
opposition held consultations that eventually resulted in the creation of a Civic 
Committee, which represented what Michnik has called an “open structure,” 
i.e., a coherent structure able to represent all opposition groups. In January 
1989, the PUWP decided to open talks with Solidarity. The Polish Roundtable 
Talks lasted from February to April 1989 and concluded with an agreement 
signed on 5 April, which recognized Solidarity’s legal right to exist and 
amended the electoral law. In the “semi-free” elections, held on 4 June (the first 
round) and 18 June (the second round), Solidarity won 69.9 percent of the vote 
and thus emerged as the indisputable winner of the historic Polish 1989 
elections (Taras 1999, 375–76). Jaruzelski was elected president of the republic 
in July 1989 and held the position until December 1990, when Wałęsa replaced 
him after new elections (Taras 1999, 377). Kiszczak, initially named by 
Jaruzelski as prime minister, failed to form a government. Subsequently, on 19 
August, Jaruzelski asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a non-communist politician, to 
form the new government. He became the first ever non-communist prime 
minister in Polish postwar history. Finally, the Mazowiecki Cabinet was 
approved by a large majority vote in the Parliament, which concluded the most 
important stage of the Polish “negotiated revolution.” 
 
 
A Discussion on (Recent) Path Dependence 
 
In scholarly literature on path dependence, two dominant types of 
sequences are considered: self-reinforcing sequences and reactive sequences 
(Mahoney 2000; Page 2006). According to James Mahoney, self-reinforcing 
sequences refer to “the formation and long-term reproduction of a given 
institutional pattern,” while reactive sequences refer to “chains of temporally 
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ordered and causally connected events” (Mahoney 2000, 508 and 526). The 
1989 sequence of collapse of communist dictatorships in ECE can be seen as a 
reactive sequence, in which each event in the sequence represented a reaction to 
previous events and a cause of subsequent events. In this respect, an initial 
event, namely the Polish Roundtable Talks, set in motion a chain of closely 
linked reactions and counter-reactions, which ultimately provoked the 
breakdown of the communist regimes in six countries in ECE. Furthermore, the 
occurrence of the first event in the sequence, the “breakpoint,” namely the 
initiation of negotiation with Solidarity by the Jaruzelski regime in early 1989, 
can be explained in terms of recent path dependence. In the Polish case, one 
should note that both the regime and the opposition which engaged in 
roundtable talks in 1989 were born of the political crisis of 1980–81. As 
mentioned, Jaruzelski conducted in December 1981 a successful preemptive 
action, which put a stop to Solidarity’s “self-limiting revolution” and prevented 
a possible Soviet intervention. In early 1989, Jaruzelski decided to engage in a 
second preemptive action, meant to ensure the political survival of the ruling 
elite into a new political order. As shown below, not only that this second action 
failed, but it evolved into a “negotiated revolution” that concluded the “self-
limiting revolution” which Solidarity had initiated in August 1980. 
In Andrzej Swidlicki’s view, the introduction of Martial Law in Poland 
was the result of a clash between two conflicting concepts of law: “Solidarity 
represented the traditional concept of law as a system of rules and restrictions 
that applied to both the authorities and the citizens.” This, however, conflicted 
with the vision of the power elite. As he further points out: “The ruling 
apparatus … did not feel itself bound by the existing legal provisions and 
reached for non-constitutional, emergency powers to restore its position as the 
uncontested authority in making, interpreting and applying the law.” The same 
author further asserts: “Martial Law was devised in such a way as to leave the 
authorities (headed by the party’s military arm) free to apply forms of 
repression of whatever scale and duration they considered necessary” (Swidlicki 
1988, 5). According to writer Sławomir Mrożek, the imposition of Martial Law 
exposed what he considered the “original sin” of the communist regime in 
Poland, i.e., its illegality and illegitimacy (apud Swidlicki 1988, 5). 
Nevertheless, the Jaruzelski regime managed to rule the country mainly through 
administrative coercion. This is not to say that force was not applied selectively 
to suppress or contain overt political opposition. Following Swidlicki, one can 
discern four stages in the post-1981 “normalization” of Poland. The first stage 
coincided with Davies’ military dictatorship period and spanned from 13 
December 1981 to 21 July 1983, when Martial Law was revoked and a partial 
amnesty was granted. The second stage, July 1983–July 1984, lasted from the 
partial amnesty of 1983 to the general amnesty of 1984, when a large majority of 
the political prisoners were liberated. The third stage, July 1984–September 1986, 
DRAGOŞ PETRESCU 
 
114
was characterized by the ability of the regime to control society; during this third 
stage the number of political prisoners grew again. The fourth stage can be 
defined as a period of stagnation. It started with another general amnesty in 
September 1986, continued with an outburst of social discontent in the summer 
of 1988 and came to an end with the decision to open talks with Solidarity, which 
Jaruzelski imposed on the party in January 1989 (Swidlicki 1988, 11–14). 
When analyzing the context in which this crucial decision was made, 
Jaruzelski’s personality and leadership style deserve further examination. An 
interesting report on Jaruzelski’s “attitude, behavior and style” was provided by 
Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff. 
Kukliński, who had served as aide to Jaruzelski, defected to the United States in 
December 1981, shortly before the declaration of Martial Law.1 According to 
Kukliński, Jaruzelski’s vision of the Soviet bloc as a sort of “socialist 
Commonwealth” was in line with the tenets of the Brezhnev Doctrine upon his 
coming to power. Consequently, Jaruzelski discouraged the independent stances 
of other “fraternal countries,” especially the Romanian stance:      
 
In the span of the last decade, Jaruzelski evinced … that he is decidedly against the course 
of becoming independent of the USSR which Romania had chosen to follow. The 
Romanian signals, which I personally transmitted from Romania, and which indicated that 
they expected the Poles to take a more independent position at the Warsaw Pact forum, 
Jaruzelski considered these nearly a plot or counter-revolutionary move and discarded the 
ideas with contempt.2 
 
At the same time, Kukliński’s analysis of Jaruzelski’s personality traits may 
give some insight into the way in which the PUWP leader and army 
commander-in-chief made his decisions: 
 
Jaruzelski has an inborn instinct for discipline and obedience combined within an instilled 
worship for power. ... The cult of power and the ecstasy which he experienced in 
exercising it resulted in the situation in which once having achieved power he never 
shared it with anyone else. ... He never made decisions precipitously, especially under the 
influence of emotions or passion. Difficult decisions took their time to ripen with him, at 
times for weeks ... and the most difficult (the imposition of Martial Law) took several 
months. Though he gladly took advantage of the advice and expertise of the specialists 
                                                          
1
  During the period 1972–81, Kukliński provided the CIA with some 40,000 pages of secret 
documents related to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. For more on this case of Cold War 
espionage see, for instance, “A Look Back… A Cold War Hero: Colonel Ryszard 
Kuklinski;” Internet; https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-
featured-story-archive/colonel-ryszard-kuklinski.html; accessed 26 April 2014. 
2
  Report by Col. Kuklinski on Jaruzelski’s Attitude, Behavior, and Style; Cold War 
International History Project (CWIHP); Internet; http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/19830101.pdf; 47. See “New Kuklinski Documents on Martial Law in 
Poland Released,” 11 December 2008; Internet; http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/new-
kuklinski-documents-martial-law-poland-released; accessed 26 April 2014.  
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and listened to the proposals of his closest associates, it was a rare occassion when he was 
influenced by their views. His decisions were independent and resulted rather from his 
own contemplations, frequently in solitude.3 
  
As shown above, the declaration of Martial Law in Poland in December 
1981 marked a shift in terms of regime political culture. Since the establishment 
of the party in December 1948 and until December 1981, the PUWP’s inner 
circle of power was characterized by a low level of cohesion. The coming to 
power of the “military party” in December 1981 put an end to party 
factionalism, and thus under Jaruzelski political decision-making was 
concentrated more than ever in the hands of the supreme leader of the party. 
Moreover, the decisions of the supreme leader of the PUWP were obeyed in 
accordance with the military chain of command. Therefore, Jaruzeski had the 
means to impose his political will upon the party. This statement deserves 
further examination.  
In the new international context determined by the Soviet renunciation of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine, Jaruzelski’s decision could be interpreted as a 
“preemptive action” intended to save what could still be saved in political terms 
at that moment. The decision of the supreme leader of the PUWP to initiate a 
second preemptive action in January 1989 was influenced most probably by the 
success of his first action of the kind, i.e., the imposition of Martial Law in 
December 1981 by the “military party,” thus avoiding a possible Soviet military 
intervention (Kramer 2009, 9–11). In terms of path dependence, however, a 
major difference existed between the two preemptive actions. The imposition of 
Martial Law in December 1981 was aimed at path stabilization, in the context 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine and in the conditions of Solidarity’s ongoing “self-
limiting revolution.” In 1988–89, in the new context of Soviet–Polish relations 
determined by Gorbachev’s renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, and faced 
with a new wave of contestation from below, Jaruzelski opted for a political 
scenario based on path departure.4 Consequently, the supreme leader of the 
PUWP decided to apply a second preemptive action and negotiate with 
Solidarity the transition to a new political order. This decision constituted the 
“breakpoint” which set in motion a reactive sequence, that is, the 1989 sequence 
of collapse of communist dictatorships in ECE. 
 
                                                          
3
  Report by Col. Kuklinski on Jaruzelski’s Attitude, Behavior, and Style, 9 and 16–17. 
4
  This approach is based on Ebbinghaus’s analysis of the three scenarios of institutional 
transformation, as follows: (1) path stabilization, i.e., “marginal adaptation to 
environmental changes without changing core principles;” (2) path departure, i.e., 
“gradual adaptation through partial renewal of institutional arrangements and limited 
redirection of core principles;” and (3) path cessation or switching, i.e., “intervention that 
ends the self-reinforcement of an established institution and may give way to a new 
institution in its place” (Ebbinghaus 2005, 17–18). 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The “negotiated revolution” in Poland inaugurated the 1989 sequence of 
collapse of the communist dictatorships in ECE. The case of Poland is the most 
complicated and difficult to explain especially because the “snowballing effect” 
did not operate in its instance. This study offers a well-grounded explanation of 
the 1989 events in Poland by focusing on a set of structural, conjunctural and 
nation-specific factors. The analysis concentrated first on the structural factors, 
i.e., economic failure and ideological decay. As previously mentioned, Poland 
went through four major crises, in 1956, 1970, 1980–81 and 1988–89, which 
resulted in major political changes at the top of the PUWP. The crises of 1956, 
1970 and 1980–81 occurred in a period in which the Brezhnev Doctrine was a 
“viable part of Moscow’s foreign policy arsenal” (Ouimet 2003, 5). The Soviet 
Union considered that it had the right to restore the “socialist order” in any 
“fraternal” country where actions from below or from above threatened the 
existence of the communist rule. 
The Polish crisis of 1980–81, however, was different from the previous 
ones: the working-class protest in Gdańsk did not turn violent. The non-violent, 
occupation and round-the-clock strike, which benefited from the support of 
prominent dissident intellectuals, forced the regime to negotiate with the strikers 
and eventually to permit the establishment of Solidarity. Over the period August 
1980–December 1981, Solidarity employed a strategy of “self-limitation” which 
envisaged a reformation of the system without regime change. In such a 
situation, the sole effective weapon of the new independent trade union was the 
general strike, but this weapon proved to be less powerful than previously 
thought in the face of the “communists in uniform.” The “military party” under 
General Jaruzelski came to the fore in December 1981, and imposed Martial 
Law. This indicated that the military arm of the party was not only unwilling to 
tolerate the existence of Solidarity, but was also able to engage in large-scale 
domestic military operations. 
In 1988–89, a peculiar aggregation of structural, conjunctural and nation-
specific factors made the Polish “negotiated” revolution possible. As shown 
above, in the particular case of Poland one can observe a close relationship 
between politics, economy and social protest. Based on the criterion of the net 
investment rate, one can identify four investment cycles in the economy of 
communist Poland, i.e., 1949–57, 1958–71, 1972–82 and 1983–88. When the 
fourth investment cycle came to an end in 1988, there were no signs of a 
different outcome than in the case of the previous three, which had ended with a 
political crisis. Social dissatisfaction with the regime was on the rise, and a new 
wave of social mobilization occurred in April–August 1988. At the same time, 
the strategy of administrative coercion introduced under the rule of Jaruzelski 
PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE INCEPTION OF THE 
POLISH “NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION” OF 1989 
 
117
made ideology void of any mobilizing power. External conjuncture was less 
favorable than ever for ruling communist parties in ECE, including the PUWP. 
In 1985, Gorbachev became the new leader of the CPSU and soon afterwards it 
became clear that the Kremlin envisaged a change of policy with regard to the 
Sovietized Europe. Beginning in 1987, Gorbachev gradually abandoned the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, which significantly reduced the margin of maneuver of the 
“military party” in power in Warsaw. The reformist course imposed by 
Gorbachev left the leaders of the “fraternal” regimes in ECE to their own 
devices, while Catholic nationalism fueled by the “Vatican factor” was acting in 
support of Solidarity. 
The nature of the Polish revolution, i.e., “negotiated” and thus non-
violent, was due to a particular interaction of regime and community political 
cultures. Based most probably on the experience of his previous highly 
successful preemptive action of December 1981, General Jaruzelski made the 
decision to initiate a second preemptive action and open talks with Solidarity in 
January 1989. As discussed above, a major difference existed between the two 
preemptive actions in terms of path dependence. The imposition of Martial Law 
in December 1981 was aimed at path stabilization, in the context of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and in the conditions of Solidarity’s “self-limiting 
revolution.” In the new context of Soviet–Polish relations determined by 
Gorbachev’s renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and faced with a new wave 
of contestation from below, Jaruzelski opted for a scenario of political 
transformation based on path departure. Consequently, the supreme leader of 
the PUWP opened negotiations with Solidarity in the hope of controlling the 
transition to a new political order. Such a decision was eased by the shift in the 
regime political culture after December 1981, which enabled the supreme leader 
of the PUWP to impose his decision on the party. Last, but by no means least, it 
was Solidarity’s strategy of self-restraint and its ability to negotiate and seek a 
compromise in a hostile political environment that permitted the negotiations to 
be finalized and the elections of 4–18 June 1989 to take place.      
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